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PERSONAL VALUES WITHIN OUR
PROFESSION
GORDON L. GRAY*
Were I so inspired, and without a time deadline, I would prefer to
write an article concerning the legal profession and personal values. Were I
to do so, I might be accused of simply "transferring bones from one grave-
yard to another" ' as J. Frank Dobie supposedly said in regard to research.
Since it is not my intent to repeat what has been already written in the area
of personal values and our profession, the law and the privatization of re-
ligion by the courts (and not just the Supreme Court), I opt to forego exten-
sive research and to speak to the layman-lawyer-teacher, about philosophy
concerning the place of personal values within our profession. Thus, I at
least avoid the wrath of all Dobie fans.
In this way, I can and will interject my own philosophy from the
standpoint of a lawyer and a Christian concerning the place of our personal
values in the law. If we have no personal values, we are probably so-
ciopaths (as it has been said that many of us are). I believe, however, that
the vast majority of lawyers (whether they are religious or not) do have
personal values concerning ethics, law and morality. As Immanual Kant
wrote: "Two things fill the soul with ever new and increasing wonder and
reverence ... The starry heavens above and the moral law within."2 Law-
yers are not excepted from this rule.
"The author is currently an Adjunct Professor at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law.
He was formerly an Adjunct Professor at Texas Christian University and University of Texas.
Before his teaching career, he was an Associate Justice of the Second Court of Appeals in Fort
Worth Texas and a Judge of Criminal District Court No. 4 (court of general jurisdiction) in Tar-
rant County, Texas. In addition he was a former trial attorney for the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission and has been in private practice for sixteen years.
' American author James Frank Dobie (1888-1964) wrote numerous non-fiction works on
the culture and lore of the American Southwest, including Coronado's Children: Tales of Lost
Mines and Buried Treasures of the Southwest; Guide to Life and Literature of the Southwest;
Guide to Life and Literature of the Southwest.
2 TREASURY OF PHILOSOPHY 643 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1955).
38 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
I. THE COURT'S "PRIVATIZING" OF RELIGION
Initially, I posit the idea that if the courts are "privatizing" or "mar-
ginalizing" religion (and religion has to include ethics and morals) then it
is the duty of every lawyer, and the law teacher, to attempt to overcome
this development in the government (especially in the Judicial branch).
Certainly, this should be a duty of a Christian or religious lawyer of any
faith as well as the duty of all lawyers.
There may be those who claim that privatization of religion and
pushing it to the edge of our culture is within the purview of " conventional
wisdom"; nonsense. Conventional wisdom does not exist. The term was
coined by the American media and cannot be defined.
Further, no one can prove that American wisdom, conventional or
otherwise, approves of or abhors what Professor Stephen L. Carter' calls
"the culture of disbelief' in his marvelous book by that name.4 If the the-
sis of an American marginalization stems from a so-called conventional
wisdom, then it rests on shaky ground. The evidence points to a very op-
posite religious caring: The United States is still a very religious nation;
the large majority of our citizens believe in a God; school prayer is favored
by our population and a substantial number of people belong to (and a large
number attend) a synagogue, temple or church.' Hence, though the courts
may be secularizing religion, the American people are not supporting the
trend, even if citizen "wisdom" claims this is happening. However, lay-
men are not lawyers, and ordinarily have little knowledge of the legal
opinions handed down by our courts.
'STEPHEN L. CARTER, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, has written several books on
morality and the law, including THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW,
RELIGION, AND MORALITY (1998).
4 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). Carter argues that "[in our sensible zeal to
keep religion from dominating our politics, we have created a political and legal culture that
presses the religiously faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes pri-
vately as well, as though their faith does not matter to them." Id. at 3.
' See Ari L. Goldman, Religion Notes, New York Times, Feb. 27, 1993, at 9 (reporting that
96% of Americans believe in God); GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S
RELIGION 55 (1989) (reporting that one in five Americans describes himself as religious); id. at
30-31 (reporting that sixty five percent of all Americans belong to a church or synagogue and
forty two percent attend services regularly); id. at 20 (stating that while "courts have consistently
struck down efforts to restore [school prayer]... [s]urveys show that Americans have just as con-
sistently favored some sort of school prayer."
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II. THE COURTS' DISCOMFORT WITH DISTINCT EXPRESSIONS OF RELIGION
The problem for the courts is that they do not seem to know how to
approach questions or issues concerning free exercise of religion. Cases
involving religious establishment arise less frequently - the United States
has no established church, and lately, has failed to covet one. Even so, the
Establishment clause has been eroded away just as the Exercise clause.6
This occurs when the courts take away a religious exercise that they con-
sider to be unnecessary or unusual. These cases include unusual religious
practices such as polygamy, snake worship, and the smoking of peyote in
Native American religious ceremonies.7 In these cases, an individual's
freedom of worship is prohibited by the law; hence, in a sense, the state is
altering, if not establishing a religion.
Perhaps, the greatest problem for the courts occurs when a particular
religious exercise or practice should be "accommodated" by the courts
even though the practice may be an unwise one. Accommodation can be
defined as the granting of preferential treatment for certain religious prac-
tices because of the unique historical circumstances of the practice and the
supposed importance of encouraging their continued existence. In the ab-
sence of a court-approved accommodation, apparently the only possible
protection some religious groups, not in the so-called mainstream of relig-
ion, have against State action, where no accommodation is granted for that
group, is the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.! However, this is a presumption on the writer's
part, as no evidence of an adminicular nature will be presented here with
the exception of the fact that Professor Stephen L. Carter expounds the
same idea in the Culture of Disbelief.9
6 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 124.
7 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (holding that it is not unconstitu-
tional to apply anti-polygamy laws to persons whose religion mandates polygamy, on the grounds
that polygamy is "an offence [sic] against society"); Tennessee ex rel Swann v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99, 107 (Tenn. 1975) (upholding a statute prohibiting snake handling in the face of a con-
stitutional attack by a religious group whose faith included snake handling, stating that while
"[t]he government must view all citizens and religious beliefs with absolute and uncompromising
neutrality," the practice of religion "is subject to reasonable regulation designed to protect a
compelling state interest."); Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (holding that a law prohibiting the smoking of peyote does not violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause because it does not specifically target religious use of peyote). But see Church of the
Lukimi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Haileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that city ordinances
prohibiting animal sacrifice specifically targeted practitioners of the Afro-Cuban religion Santeria
and, therefore were unconstitutional).
8 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 126-29 (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale in Smith).
9 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 126-29. Carter discusses the Supreme Court's rationale in
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Unfortunately, the "main line" Protestant churches are usually, and
neatly, fitted into a religious accommodation spot so that most of their
practices are allowed while the "lesser" denominations or religions, if
there are such things, may find some of their exercises or practices stricken
by the courts (i.e., polygamy, so called snake-worshipping and peyote
smoking).'" This trend shows an unfair preference for certain denomina-
tions. No doubt politics and political expediency play a role in matters of
accommodation.
The foregoing statements in regard to our courts are there only to
show, if they do, that the judiciary has a difficult job attempting to cut
through the briar patch of the "free exercise" problem or, bluntly, they
may not know what to do. In order to avoid confrontation, the courts con-
tinually pass the buck: not important, a problem for the secular authorities;
not of such significance as to merit our protection; a political question for
Congress, State legislatures or the people."
III. LAW PROFSSIONALS MUST BE TRUE TO THEIR VALUES
I am hardly in any position to challenge the thesis of a great scholar
with the stature of Father Andrew Greeley, 2 but, to be trenchant, there is
no doubt that religion is being marginalized in America today, and if he
challenges the premise of marginalization by the courts, 3 I must disagree.
Smith, supra note 8. Because the Court held that a law that infringes on a religious practice is not
unconstitutional if it is neutral and is generally applied, a religious group must prove it is the tar-
get of the legislation in order to gain Constitutional protection. See Carter, supra note 4, at 127.
Such protection would come from the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
10 See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (discussing the Free Exercise Clause); see also
CARTER, supra note 4 (noting the application of the Constitution to the Freedom of religious
practice).
1 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)
(refusing to bar as unconstitutional government logging on the sight of a Native American ceme-
tery where rituals were performed, on the grounds that the Native Americans' rights should yield
to the governments to use its land as it pleases); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (stating
"[t]he free exercise clause simply cannot be understood to require the government to conduct its
own internal affairs in the ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens" in a
case in which a two year old 's parents objected to the government's use of the child's social se-
curity number on the grounds that it robbed her of her spiritual power); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986) (upholding the right if the military to prohibit servicemen from wearing
yarmulkes on the grounds that "[t]he desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by
appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their con-
sidered professional judgment").
'2 Father Andrew M. Greeley, b. 1928, Roman Catholic Priest and Professor of Sociology,
University of Arizona at Tuscon, best selling author of fiction and non-fiction.
"3 Father Greeley refuted the secularization theory in his book UNSECULAR MAN. See
ANDREW M. GREELEY, CONFESSIONS OF A PARISH PRIEST (1896).
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There is no real agreement concerning trends toward privatization of relig-
ion, even among legal scholars, and much less, the courts or the public.
Collective public opinion may show that our citizens generally believe that
the government is marginalizing religion in this country, and citizens do
not welcome this trend. The prohibition of any religious practice by the
State is a problem and fits in the marginalization category.
With this background one wonders what we, as lawyers and teachers,
should do. It is quite obvious that we have a duty to interject our personal
values into the system when the free exercise of religion is threatened by a
vague, unknown animal called accommodation, and by inconsistent court
decisions (thanks to the Lemon case 4). Lemon gives the Establishment
Clause no theory and the Supreme Court lays down no guideline for lower
courts to follow concerning when the clause is violated. 5 This leads to in-
consistencies16 in the law and consistency is "[s]urely the very least that
integrity demands." 7
The inconsistencies shown by some of the appellate court decisions in
regard to the accommodation of certain religious practices, thereby creating
14 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In the Lemon case, the Supreme Court con-
sidered Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that allocated state monies to supplement the
salaries of teachers in parochial schools. The majority set forth a three prong test for determining
the constitutionality of statutes challenged under the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither enhances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster an 'excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.' " Id. at 612-613 (internal quotes and citations ommitted). Ap-
proximately ninety five percent of schools that benefited under Rhode Island's statute were affili-
ated with Roman Catholic churches. Id. at 608. Over ninety-six percent of the schools benefiting
from the Pennsylvania statute were church-affiliated, most of them Catholic. See id. at 610. The
Court struck down both statutes on the ground that they "fostered an impermissible degree of
[government] entanglement" with religion. See id. at 615.
1S See CARTER, supra note 4, at 109-15. Carter asserts that, the Lemon test notwithstanding,
"the Supreme Court has not really offered guidance on how to tell when the clause is violated."
See id. at 109. Carter criticizes the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause, arguing
that under the Lemon decision, "the clause exists less for the benefit of religion's autonomy than
for the benefit of secular politics." See id. at 110.
16 When it promulgates complex multipart tests for constitutional violations, the Supreme
Court is almost always luckless, but the Lemon test has been extraordinarily unhelpful to the
lower courts. Indeed, the courts have reached results that are all over the map-sometimes quite
literally. One of the more interesting cases involved a rather bland "Motorists' Prayer" to God
for safety that North Carolina printed on its official state maps. A federal court, missing the sig-
nificance of America's civil religion, held the practice to be a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Another federal court ruled that the clause prohibits religious group from petitioning the
Congress for private laws (available to all other groups) in order to secure copyrights when they
are unable to meet the statutory criteria. The list goes on and on, but Lemon remains. See
CARTER, supra note 4, at 110-11.
t' STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 48 (1996). "[A] moral understanding that has resulted
from genuine reflection should certainly be applicable across very different cases." Id. at 47.
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preferential treatment for certain practices, are often brought about because
of the fact that the courts seem to be willing to follow the will of the ma-
jority of the religious denominations. It appears obvious that the majority
of mainstream denominations would certainly be opposed to snake worship
and the other odd practices mentioned herein. When the courts use this
reasoning and follow a "majority rule" they seem to set aside or overlook
the fact that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution were created there for the specific purpose of
protecting minority religious practices from the tyranny of the majority. 8
I have the good fortune to teach an upper level law school course on
the English Common Law. The course necessarily includes the role of the
church in molding English law. I have added readings in philosophy, the-
ology and morals and ethics, for the purpose of exploring with the students
the role of these disciplines in the growth of our law. I have discovered
that after discussions of common law forms or actions, the feudal system
and the battle between king and lords and king and parliament, the classes
welcome the fresh knowledge and study of history, theology, morals and
ethics (Through the years, many of my students have had weak back-
grounds in the study of history. For example, at the beginning of the
course only one or two will have familiarity with the War of 1812). Sud-
denly, they are empowered with knowledge of Hesiod, St. Augustine, St.
Thomas Aquinas, Plato, et al., and perhaps, learn to comprehend the differ-
ence between legal and moral wrongs. In this way, I feel these students
begin to develop personal values that will play a critical role in the long,
hard life of the practice of law. At the very least, I hope the students begin
to develop values. I can open my arms but I cannot force them to step into
them.
In the practice and teaching of law, it is virtually impossible to surren-
der our values. If we can do this, we may have had no values at the outset,
but if we have personal values and do not follow them, then we destroy
ourselves. I have mentioned Christian values unnecessarily, as persons of
all faiths (or even without religious faith) have values. Christianity, then
has only so much to lend to the subject. However, I am one who believes
in a higher truth and reality and know that Christianity teaches a moral
ethic.
'a See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)
(stating that the purpose [of the Free Exercise Clause] is to secure religious liberty in the individ-
ual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962) "When the power prestige and financial support of the government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
prevailing officially approved religion is plain").
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In the history of the world there have existed some great men or, at
least, well-known men who were religious leaders, lawyers and teachers
commanding great respect. Yet, some of these men completely failed in
regard to certain personal values in their own lives. I hesitantly name Mo-
handas Gandhi, lawyer and religious leader. Even though the Mahatma
performed marvelous deeds (especially in the teaching of non-violent re-
sistance), his personal values, exhibited by his actions toward his own fam-
ily were less than admirable. 9 At times I feel more empathy for lawyer,
Robert Ingersoll,2 "the great agnostic," than for Gandhi. Ingersoll, as
Abraham Lincoln, had integrity even though he followed no organized re-
ligious belief.
On the other hand, Adam Wirth, a "bad man" and international thief
(the Napoleon of crime) whose career captured the attention of Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle to the extent that Sherlock Holmes made Wirth one of his
prey, had a rather finely honed moral code in regard to family and friends,
but no respect for the law. He may have fashioned his own theories con-
cerning the differences in moral wrongs and legal wrongs. Sometimes I
wonder if Gandhi did the same.
Albert Einstein, like Ghandi, mistreated his family (including father-
ing an illegitimate daughter) though he was a respected and complicated
genius. As Denis Bryan says, "his halo was slightly askew." 21
Perhaps the lessons learned from the lives of Gandhi, Einstein and
Wirth prove that personal values make no difference in the success of one's
chosen profession. However, I doubt the validity of such a notion.
The lawyer's, as the thieve's or Rabbi's, own ethical and moral sense
always remains, and as Benjamin Sells said in The Soul of the Law, "[h]ow
we think about ethics cannot be divorced from how we imagine our own
souls." 22 Further, if we value our souls, we should avoid trying to fit the
'9 See MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS
WITH TRUTH (1957). Gandhi describes one representative incident involving his wife's cleaning
of the chamber pot belonging to a clerk staying in their home. When his wife complained about
the task Gandhi chided her. See id. at 277.
20 Robert G. Ingersoll, American attorney and orator, (1828-1894). "The great agnostic"
was born into an intensely religious household. See THE LETTERS OF ROBERT G. INGERSOLL, 10
(Eva Ingersoll Wakefield ed. Greenwood Press 1973). Ingersoll did not believe in the existence of
God or in the divinity of Christ, yet "[f]or the man, Jesus, Ingersoll had 'infinite respect'. .. [Je-
sus] was a man who hated oppression; who despised and denounced superstition and hypocrisy;
who attacked the heartless church of his time; who excited... hatred of bigots and priest, and
who, rather than be false to his conception of truth, met and bravely suffered even in death." Id.
at 230.
21 BRYAN DENIS, EINSTEIN- A LIFE ix (1996).
22 BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW (1994).
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ethics of the world of big business into the world of the law.23 I have used
only one possible method of treating my subject. There may be others that
are better.
To summarize, I do not believe in conventional wisdom, but in a col-
lective wisdom. Conventional wisdom can be non-spontaneous, unoriginal
and insincere, even though it may be the thinking of the majority. All wis-
dom, all wise people, should readily see the American trend toward secu-
larization and/or privatization of religion and the failure of our courts to be
consistent with integrity in past "accommodation" decisions. Hence, I de-
sire more religious language and dialogue in our culture and in our law.
So believing, I have a duty to interject my personal values into our
profession. If I were to do otherwise and reject a lifetime of religious and
moral training, I would be a hypocrite and a Quisling to my own cause and
to my profession.
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